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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the appointed function of a Presidential Commission is
to reassure people and not to disturb them. But I am disturbed by the
tone of reassurance that blankets the Commission's report on Decid-
ing to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment.' I hope I am wrong, but I
am convinced that we are about to enter an era of medical practices
that will push retarded, elderly, and gravely ill people toward has-
tened deaths. The President's Commission did not intend to endorse
such practices; many of its specific proposals are obviously formulated
to avoid these results. But its strictures are too mild, its sense of
alarm too muted.
To explain the basis of my alarm, I will focus specifically on the
Commission's proposals regarding withholding treatment from im-
paired newborns, though at the end of this Article I will point to simi-
lar problems in the Commission's consideration of other proposals.
The starting point for my analysis, and the core of my concern, is not
the Commission's specific proposals but rather the vision of social
community that underlies those proposals and the results that may
flow from that vision.
In the last few decades, extraordinary advances in technology
have permitted the survival of infants whose serious disabilities would
previously have assured their death. This lifesaving technology, how-
ever, presented this problem: Many of the "rescued" infants had suf-
fered such severe brain damage or other disability that their survival
appeared pointless and perhaps even cruel. Accordingly, many in-
fants were allowed to die, both by physicians working in concert with
parents and by physicians acting alone.
The question of withholding treatment from gravely ill and re-
tarded infants is not new, however. It has virtually always been an
open secret, at least within the medical profession, that treatment was
frequently, even routinely, withheld from many impaired newborns.
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During the past decade, however, as this "secret" has been breached
with increasing frequency, both physicians and parents have begun to
seek public validation of the moral and legal propriety of withholding
treatment.2 Physicians continued this practice, but until 1983 none
was successfully prosecuted 3 and no other legal sanctions were im-
posed. By the time the President's Commission addressed this issue,
however, the 1983 Baby Doe decision had changed the public context
of the issue by finding that parents had a right to withhold lifesaving
surgery from their impaired newborn.'
Baby Doe was a Downs Syndrome boy born with a closure in his
digestive system that was certain to cause him to starve to death with-
out surgical correction. His parents decided against the surgery and
the treating obstetrician agreed. Other hospital staff, however, op-
posed their decision and brought suit in the Indiana courts to compel
the surgery. In a closed proceeding, the trial judge ruled that the par-
ents had a constitutional right to deny lifesaving treatment to their
child. On emergency appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed.
The child died six days after his birth while the state prosecutor was
seeking immediate review in the United States Supreme Court.
The Commission explicitly condemned this decision,5 but its crit-
icism effectively amounted to an endorsement of the decision's most
novel, most radical, element. The truly novel aspect of Baby Doe was
not in its particular application of the "best interest of the child" stan-
dard, but that the court was prepared to identify any circumstance
when parents had a right to withhold lifesaving treatment from their
child. In criticizing the decision, the Report stated that treatment
should be withheld only if an impaired newborn's handicaps "are so
2 The first printed breach of this "open secret" occurred in a 1973 issue of the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine in which two faculty members at the Yale Medical School docu-
mented their hospital's practice of withholding lifesaving treatment from seriously impaired
newborns. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special- Care Nursery, 289
New Eng. J. Med. 890 (1973). If this practice was "in violation of the law," they said, then
"the law should be changed." Id. at 894.
3 See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), where a
California appellate court issued a writ of prohibition against the prosecution of two physicians
on murder charges for discontinuing life-sustaining treatment for their deeply comatose pa-
tient. The court went to great lengths to validate the treating physicians' discretion to termi-
nate treatment for a patient with an "extremely poor" prognosis for recovery, and where they
acted in accordance with the expressed wishes of the patient's family. Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 486.
4 In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982),
writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482-S- 140 (Sup. Ct. Ind. May
27, 1982) (unpublished and sealed decisons); see The Story of Baby Doe, 309 New Eng. J.
Med. 664 (1983) (letter to the Editor by Dr. John E. Pless).
5 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 218-19.
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severe that continued existence would not be a net benefit" to him or
her,6 and, therefore, because Downs Syndrome is not such a severe
impairment, the Baby Doe case was wrongly decided. Although the
Commission differed as to the substantive content of that right, it en-
dorsed the general proposition that there was such a right-though
limited, of course, to "appropriate" circumstances.7
I do not want to debate the Commission or the courts about
whether such a parental right exists as a matter of constitutional law.
For present purposes, I want only to identify the novelty of the claim:
As recently as fifteen years ago, it would have been absurd, unthink-
able, and offensive to suggest the existence of such a right. This does
not mean that there is no adequate contemporary claim for such a
right; the jurisprudential question of the source of new or new-seem-
ing rights is complicated.8 Nor does this mean that fifteen years ago
no parents had ever withheld treatment from their impaired or re-
tarded child, or that formal legal processes had punished every parent
who engaged in such conduct. There was, however, a powerful social
attitude that stood both against the public recognition that such prac-
tices took place (either among parents or physicians) and against the
possibility of any public approval for such practices.9
6 Id. at 218.
7 Id. at 227.
8 The doctrinal basis for finding a parental right to withhold treatment stems from two
converging lines of Supreme Court cases. One line holds that parents must be free from state
interference in making basic decisions about their child's welfare. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The other set holds that adults
have a constitutional "right to privacy" in making decisions about their own medical treat-
ment and that children have a similar right, which their parents may exercise as surrogates for
them. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Neither set of cases necessarily compels the conclusion that
parents have a constitutional right to withhold lifesaving medical treatment. These cases all
insist that the state retains authority to protect children from parental abuse or neglect. As the
Court stated in Yoder, "the power of the parent ... may be subject to limitation ... if it
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a
potential for significant social burdens." 406 U.S. at 233-34.
9 For example, the opinion by Judge Learned Hand in Repouille v. United States, 165
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947), mirrored the conventional treatment of retarded people at that time:
killing them could not be openly avowed or morally justified, but American society was pre-
pared to look away, and let them disappear cloaked by the passage of time and distance. The
specific question in that case was whether Louis Repouille, a recent immigrant, was entitled to
United States citizenship. In 1939, Repouille had killed his severely disabled son after caring
for him at home for 13 years. Judge Hand described the boy as "blind, mute, and deformed.
He had to be fed; the movements of his bladder and bowels were involuntary, and his entire life
was spent in a small crib." Id. at 152. While Repouille had been criminally prosecuted for
manslaughter in the first degree, the jury showed its sympathy by finding him guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree and recommending "utmost clemency." Repouille was sen-
tenced to probation without imprisonment. Id. at 153.
Judge Hand ruled that Repouille's petition must be denied because the statute required
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This social attitude has obviously changed in our time. The pub-
lic avowals by physicians, the Baby Doe decision, and the proposals by
the President's Commission are evidence of this change. But there is
a deeper question that must be asked, a question about the larger so-
cial meaning and consequence of this change. If indeed we are in the
midst of changing moral attitudes on this subject, if a new conception
of parental rights has emerged in our jurisprudence, then this change
is more significant than a changing fashion regarding taste in clothing,
for example. Men's neckties can go from wide to narrow to wide
again; even a prolonged period of abandonment for bow-ties or turtle-
necks has no necessary long term implications. This is not so for
moral attitudes. When the issue is important, when it reaches deep
into the structure of our conceptions of ourselves, then a change in
one aspect brings consequential change in other aspects and, in time,
change becomes so pervasive and so interlocked that return to earlier
moral visions is simply impossible, if not inconceivable. Changing
moral attitudes toward withholding care from impaired children is
such an issue.
I. THE PARENT/CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Consider the implications of this issue on our conception of the
forces that truly bind parent and child. A series of California court
decisions beginning in 1977 address the question whether a "true"
parent would choose to withhold life-prolonging medical care from a
retarded child. At its outset, In re Phillip B. 'o resembled Baby Doe.
Phillip Becker was a Downs Syndrome child who had been institu-
tionalized shortly after birth by his parents. When he was six years
old, physicians diagnosed a heart defect, which, they said, could be
surgically corrected but otherwise would lead to his early death. Phil-
lip's parents refused to permit the surgery and, after several years of
desultory discussions, the physicians brought suit against the parents
to compel surgery. The California courts decided that Phillip's par-
ents had a right to refuse this surgery. That seemed the end of the
matter (and, in due course, of Phillip).
But the case then took an extraordinary turn. Mr. and Mrs. Her-
bert Heath, volunteer workers in the retardation institution, had be-
"good moral conduct" and Repouille's action could not be so construed. Nonetheless, Hand
continued, the statutory requirement applied only for the five years preceding naturalization,
so that if Repouille were to renew his petition after five years of the date of his son's death, it
"would not be open to ... objection; and. . . the pitiable event, now long passed, [would] not
prevent Repouille from taking his place among us as a citizen." Id. at 153-54.
10 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
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come emotionally attached to Phillip and had spent considerable time
with him both in the institution and during numerous visits to their
home. They now brought suit alleging that the mutual emotional at-
tachment between themselves and the child, entitled them to be con-
sidered his parents, at least for purposes of authorizing the surgical
treatment that could save his life. After extensive hearings and ap-
peals, the California courts effectively reversed their first decision and
ruled that the Heaths could authorize the surgery for Phillip.II
In this case the very basis of parenthood was transformed from a
biological to a psychological one by the claim that Phillip's "original"
parents had forfeited their parental status by deciding against provid-
ing lifesaving treatment for their retarded child. 2 Beneath the ulti-
mate court decision in this case is a powerful ideal of parenthood-
that a "true" parent always saves life, always provides care, no matter
how undeserving his child might seem. This, after all, was the basis
on which Solomon identified the true mother between the rival claim-
ants: a true mother would save her child's life no matter what sacrifice
was involved. This ideal of parenthood was challenged by the first
round of court decisions in Phillip's case. But in the second round,
the Heaths prevailed in their effort to save Phillip's life by invoking
this underlying public ideal of the "true" parent and transforming
themselves, in the court's eyes, into Phillip's parents.
The Phillip B. case does not conclusively demonstrate, however,
that this ideal has triumphed over the proposition that parents can
choose death as the best care possible for their gravely impaired chil-
dren. The Heaths' longstanding relationship with Phillip may distin-
guish this situation from that of newborns like Baby Doe, where the
Indiana courts disregarded the presence of several prospective adop-
tive parents and deferred to the biological parents' decision. The re-
sult of the Phillip B. case may thus only be a momentary interruption
in the advance of a new cultural norm. The question for us, then-
the question for the President's Commission-is whether we, as a so-
ciety, should accept or resist the advance of this new norm.
The President's Commission did not address the implications of
1 The unpublished court opinions are reproduced in W. Wadlington, C. Whitbread & S.
David, Children in the Legal System 921-23 (1983).
12 For the tension between the claims of "biological" and "psychological" parents, and
reasons for preferring the latter claims in some contexts, see J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A.
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). In a subsequent book, however, these
authors disregard the potential relevance of this tension by opting, without qualification, for
the psychological parents' right to withhold lifesaving treatment. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A.
Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child 91-109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Before the
Best Interests].
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its proposals for this public ideal of parenthood. To be sure, the Com-
mission left room for public reversal of parents' decisions to withhold
treatment by specifying that internal hospital review boards should
scrutinize all such decisions and should refer "appropriate" cases to
public agencies where the parents' decisions would not result in a "net
benefit" for the child. But the Commission did not address the ques-
tion in the specific context presented by the Phillip B. case-the Solo-
monic context of rivals for the status of parent-although there were
realistic, practical reasons for the Commission to have done so.
Adoption of impaired infants has become an increasingly com-
mon practice since various social trends, including ready access to
abortions, have reduced the numbers of healthy babies available for
adoption.' 3 Moreover, the public furor accompanying the Baby Doe
decision, and the intense involvement of "Right to Life" lobbying
groups in that furor,' 4 are likely to give considerable impetus to the
creation of organized mechanisms for finding adoptive parents for im-
paired newborns whose biological parents decide against treatment.
The Commission could have promoted those efforts in its Report. It
could have specifically urged internal hospital review panels to stimu-
late the creation of local adoption placement mechanisms or at least
to ensure that biological parents know that adoptive parents may be
found for their impaired child. But the Commission virtually ignored
these issues. It implicitly assumed that the biological parents' deci-
sion to withhold treatment did not forfeit-or even presumptively
forfeit-their status as "true" parents.
This is, I submit, a remarkably thoughtless stance. It is as if
King Solomon were prepared to award the baby to one claimant with-
out acknowledging that a rival claimant sat outside the closed doors
to his court. As a matter of formal legal precedent, of course, the
Commission was not obliged to recognize the claims of potential
adoptive parents. Potential adoptive parents are strangers to an im-
paired newborn and, in many ways, the biological parents are also
strangers to this child, unexpectedly confronted as they are with its
unwanted, disturbing and grief-provoking abnormalities. The Phillip
13 See Note, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 Cath. Law. 48, 48-49 & n.6 (1976).
14 A storm of protest erupted against the Indiana Supreme Court's apparent endorsement
of the proposition that withholding lifesaving treatment from a retarded infant could not be
legally prohibited because parents had a constitutional right to make such a decision. "Right
to life" groups expressed outrage that any lifesaving treatment should be refused to any infant
no matter how severe his disability. They argued that the Indiana court's decision was the
predictable consequence of the holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that fetal life can
be aborted. See K. Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 154-56, 207-08 (1984).
For the response of the federal government to this protest, see infra note 20.
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B. case is distinguishable as a proposition of law, however. Phillip
and the Heaths were not strangers, they had already formed a mutual
emotional bond when the Beckers refused to permit heart surgery for
him.
No court decision required the Commission to acknowledge
these propositions. But if the Commission had been attentive to the
full moral implications of the new social visibility of a parent's right
to withhold treatment from an impaired child, it would have grasped
the challenge implicit in this claim to the traditional definition of
"true" parenthood. Inadvertently, the Commission added its weight
to the social forces that are working toward a redefinition of
parenthood by which a "true" parent does not always give care with-
out question and a "true" child is not always cared for unstintingly.
II. THE PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
In the same inadvertent way, the Commission supported compa-
rable changes in the definition of what it means to be a physician.
There is a powerful tradition in our society that a "true" physician
(like a "true" parent) always gives care, always saves lives, and that
prospective patients can unquestioningly rely on that caretaking.
This ethos has been attacked with good reason in recent decades for
leading physicians to impose medical treatment on patients without
regard for their wishes.15 This ethos, moreover, is not always put into
practice, as medical care is routinely withheld from poor people, old
people, racial minorities, and other vulnerable, disadvantaged
groups.' 6 These refusals of medical care do not, however, challenge
the ethical ideal. Indeed, the ideal is regularly invoked to condemn
the practices (just as widespread practices of child abuse are regularly
condemned by invocation of the ideal conception of parent caretak-
ing). But here too, as with the ideal of parenting, the Commission
embraced a conception of physicianhood that is antithetical to this
traditional ideal, and yet, did not acknowledge this implication.
The contravention of the traditional ideal is perhaps clearest in
the Commission's proposal for internal hospital review panels to
"confirm the propriety of a decision" by parents and physicians to
withhold medical treatment.' 7 In their composition and in the char-
acter of their deliberations, the proposed panels would closely resem-
ble the committee, convened some twenty years ago in Seattle,
15 See J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 104-06 (1984).
16 See Hilfiker, Allowing the Debilitated to Die: Facing Our Ethical Choices, 308 New
Eng. J. Med. 716 (1983).
17 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 227.
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Washington, to decide who could have access to limited lifesaving re-
nal dialysis resources.
Seattle physicians convened a committee of clergymen, lawyers,
and nonprofessional "citizens" to predict the benefits of dialysis for
the competing candidates, comparing factors such as general health
and life expectancy with the utility of the treatment, the strength of
their family and community ties, and their intellectual and emotional
capacity or self-care and compliance with medical directives.'" This
committee (popularly, and perjoratively, known as the God commit-
tee) provoked considerable public opposition. Its creation was a
seemingly reasonable response to a practical problem: there were, in
the early 1960's, more candidates for dialysis than available equip-
ment and allocations accordingly had to be rpade on some basis. But
this committee, with the high visibility of its decisions regarding who
should live and who should die, was morally intolerable in our society
at that time. In particular, the committee's very existence offended
the social ideal that a physician's role was to save life, rather than to
decide who deserved to live and limit treatment on that basis. 9
The Commission's proposal for a formalized committee to affirm
treatment refusals regarding impaired newborns also arises from a
seemingly reasonable appreciation of a practical problem. But the
Commission was nonetheless inattentive to the similarities between its
own proposal and the God committee mechanism. The Commission
did not discuss, and perhaps did not even consider, how change in
society's moral sense since the 1960's might have made these death-
dispensing committees acceptable. More important, the Commission
did not address the question whether, even if such a mechanism were
widely acceptable today, this is a change in moral sensibility that
should be opposed rather than accomodated.
I don't know whether we have come to a different moral climate
on this issue from the 1960's.20 But I do believe that if there has been
a change, at the very least the change should be identified and its
18 R. Fox & J. Swazey, The Courage to Fail: A Social View of Organ Transplants and
Dialysis 244-46 (1974).
19 Id. at 246-49, 252-53, 267-68.
20 The current existence of an intense moral struggle is revealed in the differing responses
of the three branches of the federal government to the Baby Doe decision. First, in 1982, the
executive branch found authority, in a congressional act forbidding "discrimination" against
handicapped people, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), to prohibit any
federally funded hospital from withholding care from an impaired newborn. To implement
this prohibition, the executive established so-called Baby Doe squads to investigate any allega-
tions of such hospital conduct. In 1984, the Second Circuit ruled that there was no statutory
authority for this prohibition, sustaining a challenge to the government's demand for hospital
records where parents of a spina bifida newborn (known as Baby Jane Doe) allegedly decided
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significance explored. For myself, I would go further: the change, if it
has happened, should be opposed. The reasons for my opposition
come from my beliefs about the likely social significance of this
change.
III. THE INCLUSIVE COMMUNAL IDEAL IN AMERICAN LIFE
The likely significance of the present shift in moral climate can
be explored by considering the resolution of the controversy that
raged around the Seattle God committee in the 1960's. The practical
impetus for this committee was the limited availability of resources
for renal dialysis. In 1972, Congress made an open ended commit-
ment of public funds for anyone in need of dialysis, thus ending the
moral dilemma with a wave of its fiscal wand.21 In making a financial
commitment for this purpose, Congress seemed to be acting on the
basis of two factual assumptions, one of which was obviously false
and the other was soon to be proven false. The obvious falsehood was
that this society could devote sufficient resources to medical care to
save every life that might technologically be saved in any circum-
stance. The second falsity, as it turned out, was that the cost to meet
everyone's need for renal dialysis was relatively modest. Within five
years, federal expenditures had risen to some $600 million annually
for the care of some 25,000 patients, and the annual expense sur-
passed one billion dollars shortly thereafter.22
But what led Congress into this incautious, extravagent commit-
ment in 1972? It was clear from the floor debates and earlier legisla-
tive hearings that members of Congress could not tolerate the moral
implications of the God committee and its underlying operating
to withhold life-prolonging care from her. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984).
Congress then quickly enacted the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
457, § 121(3)(A), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1749, 1752 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5102), which provide that state child protective agencies receiving federal funds must
themselves police hospitals to ensure that lifesaving treatment is not withheld from an infant
unless, in effect, the child is already inevitably dying or is "chronically and irreversibly coma-
tose." 131 Cong. Rec. H9805 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
The last official word on this controversy has not yet been spoken. It is conceivable that
the federal courts could invalidate this invocation of the federal spending power on the ground
that it trespasses on protected state autonomy in such traditional matters as operation of state
hospitals, regulation of medical practice in private hospitals, and governance of family rela-
tions. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981) ("[t]here
are limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the States pursuant to its spending
power").
21 See Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for Victims of End-Stage Re-
nal Disease, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1976, at 196.
22 Id. at 200-01.
1984]
HeinOnline -- 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 275 1984-1985
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
premise that lifesaving medical care could be explicitly withheld from
a needy, helpless person. 23 Beneath this moral revulsion was an im-
age, an ideal, a mythic vision of a community. This communal ideal
was a homespun, uniquely American product. It is the ideal en-
scribed, among other places, at the foot of the Statue of Liberty: that
no suffering person will ever be turned away from this place, that our
community is open and generous and rich enough to care for every-
one in need, "give me your tired, your poor. . . ." It is the Ameri-
can version of the new Jerusalem, the universal human community
welcoming all strangers in need, turning away no one.
To be sure, we have never had the full resources to honor this
commitment, we have never committed all possible resources avail-
able for this purpose, and at various times in our history we have even
explicitly repudiated this commitment. But Congress reaffirmed this
commitment in 1972 to people who would otherwise die from kidney
failure. These people were not a powerful political lobby in any ordi-
nary sense; therewere, after all, only 25,000 of them in 1977 and even
with their families and friends, few members of Congress need have
feared their retaliatory wrath at the polls. Their force arose simply
because their neediness and suffering had become so publicly visible
by the very creation of the Seattle God committee. 4 To permit their
deaths in this circumstance was clearly to repudiate the inclusive
communal ideal in American life. Congress' commitment to save
them became an occasion for reaffirmation of this central ideal.
There may be some significant differences between the Commis-
sion's proposal for internal hospital review panels and the Seattle God
committee. Impaired newborns may be viewed more as individuals
than as competitors for scarce medical resources, and dialysis seems
to promise full restoration of health as opposed to the permanent disa-
bilities that loom for impaired newborns. Yet these differences can be
exaggerated: dialysis carries unavoidable physical and psychological
burdens for its recipients, 2 and resource availability is a central deter-
minant of the ultimate extent of physical and mental disability for
many seriously impaired newborns.26
23 Id. at 223-24.
24 See G. Calabresi & P. Bobbit, Tragic Choices 22-27 (1978).
25 See R. Fox & J. Swazey, supra note 18, at 275-78; Evans, Manninen, Garrison, Hart,
Blagg, Gutman, Hull, & Lowrie, The Qualify of Life of Patients with End-Stage Renal Dis-
ease, 312 New Eng. J. Med. 533 (1985).
26 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit explicitly link resource availability and provision of lifesav-
ing treatment in this.way:
parental autonomy is not accorded recognition and if society insists through law
that such children, indeed any children, receive medical treatment rejected by their
parents, the state must take upon itself the burden of providing the special finan-
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But whatever the magnitude of these differences, they do not di-
minish the fundamental parallel: in both cases, formal social authority
would be granted to one person or group to withhold lifesaving treat-
ment from another. While the specific rationales for withholding
treatment might differ, explicit social legitimation of such withholding
generally could lead to the repudiation of the inclusive communal
ideal.
The embrace of this ideal in 1972 had consequences beyond the
fact that some kidney patients' lives were saved, and its repudiation
today would have consequences beyond the death of some impaired
newborns. One such early consequence, I believe, was the congres-
sional enactment of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act,27 which effectively repudiated state laws that had excluded
such children from public schools (thus banishing them to geographi-
cally hidden residential institutions), and which made a considerable
commitment of federal funds to assist states in educating these chil-
dren.2 This legislation was the "consequence" of the earlier action
regarding renal dialysis in the sense that the same vision underlay
both-that of an inclusive community, rejecting no one and making a
special effort to include those with special vulnerabilities.
This vision, moreover, was not limited to people with special
health disabilities. There was a similar connection between the 1972
legislation for kidney patients, the 1975 legislation for handicapped
children, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act,29 which prohibited race dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of homes throughout the nation. This
communal commitment, in turn, came from the moral force, the in-
clusive communal vision, of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education."° All of these actions shared the same underlying
moral vision, each having a consequential relationship with the other.
There was no necessary causal connection among them, however:
one act made it easier for the next-easier but not inevitable. And the
converse is also true-that a refusal to acknowledge an inclusive com-
munal relation with one group makes it easier to ignore the claims of
another, to repudiate any communal relation with another.
cial, physical, and psychological resources essential to making real the value it
prefers for the child it "saves." ... Minimally, it should fully finance their spe-
cial-care requirements.
Before the Best Interests, supra note 12, at 97.
27 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1982).
28 Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 94-168, 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1425, 1432.
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
30 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
..1984]
HeinOnline -- 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 277 1984-1985
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
The underlying stubborn reality is that each act of communal
inclusion and affirmation has been met with resistance, has been and
remains filled with difficulty. The reality is that communal bonds are
fragile, difficult to enforce or to sustain, easily obstructed or repudi-
ated. These bonds are never more than tenuous linkages built against
powerful psychological and social forces that drive us apart, that lead
us toward hostile competition for inevitably limited resources, that
make us fearful strangers to one another.
If I am right in all of this, then the Commission's proposal to
approve the denial of lifesaving treatment to impaired infants is so-
cially reckless. Formal legitimation of authority to withhold treat-
ment would give impetus to these divisive forces. However cautious
the Commission seemed in recognizing only a qualified "parental
right," however guarded it was in proposing internal hospital review
committees that would in "appropriate" cases be required to report to
public agencies, the Commission did not understand the potentially
widespread implications of its position. I do not claim that the Com-
mission's proposals will lead this country to repudiate communal rela-
tions between blacks and whites (though I do believe that its
proposals are related to the same social forces that are pressing, with
considerable strength, toward that repudiation in many contexts).
But in the specific context of the rights of handicapped people and the
protection of those who need special medical care that the Commis-
sion does overtly address, I believe that direct and harmful conse-
quences would come from the repudiation of an inclusive communal
relationship with impaired infants.
IV. THE PAST BECKONS
The Commission proposals come, after all, at a specific historical
moment. It is always difficult to draw precise historic parallels, to
recognize the trends at work in our own time by analogizing to some
past time. But I believe that we have been here before, that we stood
earlier at this historical crossroad and took a shameful path. A hun-
dred years ago, the question was the communal status of blacks. In
the preceding fifty years, around 1830, this country had moved from
public approval of slavery-an uneasy approval, but approval none-
theless-to a growing revulsion, then to emancipation, and then to an
effective repudiation of that emancipation, and virtually avowed reen-
slavement. The dispositive shifts in attitude occurred in the space of
just one generation, from 1860 to the 1880s.
At the same time that an inclusive communal relationship with
blacks was repudiated, a similar social attitude was turned toward
[Vol. 6:267
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retarded people. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the cre-
ation of monstrous residential institutions that embodied the exclu-
sion of retarded people from our communal life.3 ' As noted earlier,
withholding lifesaving treatment from impaired infants-a purposeful
infliction of death-has never been an openly avowed and approved
public policy in this country.3 2 The avowed policy was, however, not
benign. We did not kill retarded children. We buried them alive in
hidden public residential institutions.
A generation ago, during the 1950's and '60's, we reopened the
question of our communal race relations. And once again, with a
similarly brief time lag, social attention focused on the communal sta-
tus of retarded people. The existence of, and true conditions in, retar-
dation institutions were widely admitted in public forums during the
1960's 33-the moment of emancipation. A public commitment was
made to open community-based facilities for retarded people, to ac-
knowledge a communal caretaking obligation and caring relationship
with them-the promise of reconstruction. Now, however, we seem
poised at the moment of reenslavement-not, perhaps, by returning to
the old practice of live burials, but by bestowing approval on the real
thing, the purposeful infliction of death.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT (FROM A
RIGHT TO A DUTY TO WITHHOLD TREATMENT)
The formal announcement of this new policy of legitimizing the
withholding of lifesaving treatment from impaired newborns can be
seen in the Baby Doe decision by the Indiana courts and the first Phil-
lip B. decision, never explicitly repudiated by the California courts.
While the President's Commission criticized these specific decisions,34
its proposal inadvertently adds to their underlying social momentum.
The most likely immediate consequence would be evident in parents'
attitudes toward their impaired newborns and their perceptions of so-
cial expectations for them. This momentum, however, does more
than give approval to parents and physicians who want to withhold
medical treatment from Downs Syndrome or other anomalous chil-
dren. It will press parents beyond the right to withhold lifesaving
treatment toward the belief that they have a "duty" to withhold this
31 See P. Tyor, Segregation or Surgery: The Mentally Retarded in America, 1850-1920
(1972).
32 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33 See President's Special Message to the Congress on Education, Pub. Papers 105, 113
(Jan. 29, 1963).
34 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 218-19.
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treatment because our society has clearly signalled both its unwilling-
ness to extend a communal relationship to these children and a conse-
quent inhospitality-an intolerance, perhaps-for their very
existence.
A. The Child and Society (The "Net Benefit" Standard and
Altruism)
The President's Commission explicitly formulated its proposals
to avoid the creation of a duty to withhold treatment. But in con-
demning the Baby Doe decision, the Commission paradoxically relied
on the underlying moral premises that themselves give social momen-
tum to these pernicious, unintended results.
The Commission acknowledged the problem of social prejudice
toward, and the consequent vulnerability of, handicapped people. In
formulating a substantive standard that would authorize withholding
treatment from such children, the Commission tried to provide pro-
tection against this vulnerability: The Commission stated that treat-
ment should be withheld only if the child's handicaps "are so severe
that continued existence would not be a net benefit" to him or her."5
It concluded that by this "net benefit" criterion, treatment clearly
should have been provided for Baby Doe. 6 But the contradictory
impulse in the Commission's formulation is revealed in its specifica-
tions regarding the content of this "net benefit" criterion. The Com-
mission stated that whoever applied this -"net benefit" standard-
whether parent, physician, or public official-must "exclude[ ] con-
sideration of the negative effects of an impaired child's life on other
persons, including parents, siblings, and society.""7  The deci-
sionmaker, so the Commission enjoins, "is obligated to try to evaluate
benefits and burdens from the infants's own perspective," excluding
these other possible competing perspectives.3"
There is an internal logical tension in this formulation that con-
tains paradoxically destructive implications. The tension is this: If I
imagine myself to be a seriously impaired infant and, as that infant,
ask myself whether I get more benefit than burden from continued
life, does it necessarily follow that I must ignore the burdens created
by my impairments on my parents, my brothers and sisters, and the
society of which I am a member? What if I, as that impaired infant,
want to save these others from suffering on my account? What if I
35 Id. at 218.
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want to define my self-interest in a way that gives substantial weight
to alleviating the suffering of others, even greater weight than I give to
alleviating my own suffering? Am I forbidden to act on altruistic mo-
tives, am I necessarily restricted only to act on the most narrowly
conceived, selfishly grasping motives? The Commission's formulation
seems to bar any ascription of such altruistic, self-denying motives to
an impaired infant.39
But then, we will ask, why should the rest of us behave altruisti-
cally toward this selfish, grasping, unreciprocating person? If this in-
fant is truly a member of our community, then why shouldn't he be
expected to give at least some weight to others' interests? But if he is
exempt from this communal obligation why, then, are the rest of us
obliged to weigh only his interests and none of our own in making
decisions that obviously affect us both?
There is more than a formal logical bind here. This internal ten-
sion in the Commission's formulation highlights the basic underlying
social force that is likely to defeat the Commission's avowed protec-
tive purposes toward impaired infants. The Commission's proposed
standard relies on the rejection of any social commitment to give sub-
stantial weight to others' interests, the very rejection of a communal
caretaking obligation that in itself jeopardizes the communal status of
impaired children. The Commission's proposed standard on behalf of
the impaired child elevates selfishness to a high moral plane. It thus
inadvertently endorses the anticommunitarian ethos that is an in-
creasingly pervasive characteristic of our time. The Commission im-
plicitly relies on an understanding that an impaired infant would be
and should be as narrowly self-centered in his calculation of net bene-
fits and burdens as the rest of us.
But here is the central problem: There is no room for severely
impaired children or adults in a society where it is permissible for
others always to behave in a narrowly self-interested way, always to
deny any moral imperative for self-sacrifice in the service of others,
always to prefer self-serving actions at the expense of communal
bonds. Severely impaired children and adults cannot thrive, indeed
they can hardly live, unless others are prepared to prize a communal
relationship with them and to place loyalty to that communal bond
above their own narrowly conceived self-interests. These infants and
adults depend on others' willingness to care for them.
To be sure, many of these infants and adults are not inevitably
helpless; many have potential for substantial or even complete self-
39 See R. Burt, Taking Care of Strangers 151-52 (1979).
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sufficiency. But considerable support, both emotional and financial, is
required from others for the ultimate realization of their potential ca-
pacities. A society gripped by the ideology of extreme individualism
cannot generate this kind of support. There is an insufficient sense of
connection, the bonds of community are too attenuated in such a soci-
ety to sustain the social and individual efforts required to provide ade-
quately nurturant care and support to impaired children and adults.
In such a society, moreover, not only strangers, but also parents
of impaired children, are implicitly encouraged to deny the existence
of caretaking obligations and communal bonds toward such children.
This encouragement is the route that leads parents from the proposi-
tion that they have a right to deny care to their impaired children to
the conviction that they have a duty to deny care. This sense of duty
arises because the dominant ideology, the moral image that the soci-
ety maintains of itself, posits that each individual must stand alone (or
at least must have the readily achievable capacity for independent au-
tonomy). This ideology dictates that no one is entitled to depend in-
definitely on others for support and caretaking. It thus excludes those
in need of such caretaking as a moral imperative, as a duty that re-
quires the social exclusion of the impaired individual. This was the
moral premise on which the isolating, monstrous residential institu-
tions for retarded were created around the turn of the century. This is
the moral premise that will lead parents (as well as physicians and
judges) to exclude impaired children by withholding treatment from
them.
B. The Parent and Society (Responsibility and Isolation)
For parents, in particular, this impetus will gather momentum
from the special circumstances at the birth of their impaired child.
Typically, healthy and able-bodied parents hoping for a "normal,"
perhaps even a "perfect," child are suddenly thrust into a position of
responsibility for an abnormal infant. However fully parents might
grow to treasure their abnormal child, and to reformulate their own
identities as "normal people," this response does not arise easily and
immediately at the first moments of their new and unexpected
relationship.'
Understandably, these special difficulties may affect parents' atti-
40 See Solnit & Stark, Mourning and the Birth of a Defective Child, 16 Psychoanalytic
Study of the Child 523 (1961); Drotar, Baskiewicz, Irvin, Kennell, & Klaus, The Adaptation
of Parents to the Birth of an Infant With a Congenital Malformation: A Hypothetical Model,
56 Pediatrics, Nov. 1975, at 710 (based on interviews of the parents of 20 children over a
period of nearly two months commencing from one week after child's birth).
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tudes when, shortly after the child's birth, they are asked to decide
whether he or she should live or die. Parents are the obvious candi-
dates to make this decision because their lives will be most directly
affected and because the child's welfare depends principally on their
continued involvement. Yet implicit in this "parental right" is not
only the proposition that parents alone have this right to decide but
that they are alone in making this decision.
This implication can readily be magnified by the parents' per-
ceived isolation from their prior inclusion in the community of "nor-
mal people." Whether or not they are conscious of this impulse, it is
temptingly easy for them to reenter the "normal community" by exer-
cising their recognized right to let their impaired child die.
Many parents would recoil-just as the Commission did-from
even a whispered invocation of this kind of self-interest. Even so, this
perceived isolation readily translates itself into the proposition that
the child's own interest is best served by death; these parents are
forced by their social isolation to conclude that no one will help them
and their child, and that all assistance for their impaired child must
come from their own limited and generally insufficient resources. Un-
less these parents possess a heroic vision of their own nurturing capa-
bilities, this isolation will ultimately lead to a decision in favor of the
child's death.
The implication of a parent's isolated authority to determine the
survival of an impaired child may lead to negative societal conse-
quences of a more general nature. Should this parental right be
clearly established, then the survival of an impaired infant would con-
note that his parents not only wanted this result but could have de-
cided otherwise. From this connotation, it is only a short step to
conclude that the parents alone bear the responsibility of satisfying
the child's full needs from their own resources-that it is their "pri-
vate problem," as the child's survival was an exercise of their "private
authority." Consequently, this "family privacy" right would foster
the erosion of an already tenuous communal commitment, and would
feed the natural impulse among "normal people" to deny assistance to
disabled people.
For all these reasons, the formal recognition of a parental right
to withhold treatment would tend to press toward its exercise. The
"right" would not remain a neutral construct, available merely for
those who choose to use it. The right would feed itself, and would
magnify the belief that death best serves everyone's interests, includ-
ing the impaired child's.
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CONCLUSION
I do not claim that death is never preferable for any impaired
child. In many circumstances, death can be the most humane, even
loving care a parent can provide. But this reality does not necessarily
demand the formal legitimation of such a parental right. Establishing
a formal social regime to give prior explicit authorization for death
has, for the reasons I have indicated, an intrinsic momentum that in-
flicts terrible suffering on many people, even though continued treat-
ment might also inflict suffering on many impaired children and their
families. This is the pervasive tragedy in these cases: that suffering
cannot be averted, no matter what individual or general social deci-
sions might be made regarding seriously impaired infants.
I am not suggesting that the Commission simply made a drafting
error in the formulation of its proposal and that socially vulnerable
infants could have been more reliably protected if the Commission
had drafted a different verbal formula to govern decisions about with-
holding medical treatment. My point is that the Commission's for-
mulation reveals an underlying ideology in our society that itself
jeopardizes the protective goal that the Commission set for itself. The
Commission should have identified the expansive implications of this
individualistic ideology in any proposal to legitimize the withholding
of care from impaired infants, no matter how such a proposal might
be drafted. The Commission should have warned that the claims for
parental "privacy rights" in withholding care have an inevitable pub-
lic significance, should have warned that formal social legitimation of
these actions transforms private conduct into public performance, ap-
proves and invites imitation. The Commission should have warned
that this formal legitimation erodes the inevitably fragile public con-
nection between an impaired child, and his parents and their commu-
nity, upon which any child's welfare, upon which his very life,
inevitably depends.
If the Commission had understood these potentialities, it might
also have seen the same forces at work in other contexts where the
withholding of lifesaving medical treatment was at issue, and might
have seen how these same forces could similarly undermine its
avowed protective purposes in those other contexts. Consider, for ex-
ample, the Commission's general approbation of the principle that
since autonomous individuals have a right to determine their own
medical treatment, a competent individual has a correlative right to
decline lifesaving treatment.4" As a general proposition I have no
41 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 45.
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quarrel with this. But there is a considerable social danger lurking in
this seemingly self-evident formulation, for the individualistic ideol-
ogy that lies beneath this formulation, giving it contemporary moral
force, also implies that there is no public commitment, no com-
munally acknowledged obligation, to sustain and nurture burden-
somely sick people. This implication may only be implicit, it may be
glimpsed only as if "through a glass, darkly"; but if a gravely ill per-
son, if a sick old person, sees this message embedded in the contempo-
rary social ideology, then he will construe his individualistic "right to
die" in a different light. Then he will see this right as something
more, as a "duty to die" because no one wants him to act differently,
because no one will sustain him in adversity, and because then even he
will refuse this caretaking sustenance to himself.
The Commission did not intend this result any more than it in-
tended to require parents of impaired newborns to withhold treatment
from them. But the Commission did not acknowledge, perhaps it did
not even understand, the potential power of the underlying social
forces at work in the context of withholding lifesaving treatment, and
how readily these social forces might find ideological expression by
transforming rights into duties to die or to inflict death.
Even if the Commission had acknowledged all of this, it might
still have offered the same proposals. It might still have concluded
that treatment must be withheld from some gravely ill newborns and
that explicit social validation of this withholding is necessary to
achieve this result or that seriously ill adults must be free, and for-
mally acknowledged as free, to reject lifesaving treatment. There are
authentic problems that these proposals address and, in their own
terms, would solve. On balance, perhaps the Commission's proposals
are reasonable, sensible, practical. But the Commission's presentation
of these proposals lacks balance. There are serious social risks in
these proposals, risks that the Commission was not prepared to admit.
Perhaps the Commission thought its public function was to reas-
sure rather than disturb people. But I for one am disturbed. I fear
that fifty years from now we will see these matters in retrospect, not
"through a glass, darkly, but then face to face." I fear we will be
appalled and ashamed at what we see then in our communal treat-
ment of retarded people, of physically disabled people, of sick and old
people-just as we were horrified when, in the 1960's, we looked in-
side our public retardation institutions as if for the first time "face to
face." And I hear us asking fifty years from now, as we asked twenty
years ago, "How did this happen? Men and women of good will and
good intentions set the forces in motion that led to this result. How
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did this happen? And how can we protect ourselves against this hap-
pening, once again?"
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